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Cardiff: Birthplace of  a new Transatlantic 
Narrative? 
Jo Coelmont 
 
Cardiff has the potential to turn into a 
“great meeting”, if the focus is on 
forging a new and attractive narrative to 
underpin a solid transatlantic security 
relationship, in which NATO finds its 
place. But Europeans must become 
serious on defence – and not only 
because the US asks for it. Otherwise, 
the EU and for sure the European States 
will become strategic bystanders and 
even objects of great power competition. 
That would be a real game-changer. 
That is why, in Cardiff, “we” ought to be 
ambitious enough to deal with the real 
issues, including the relationship 
between NATO and the CSDP. 
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questions are becoming more uncomfortable 
than ever.  At the same time there is still the 
intense belief across the Atlantic in shared 
values, interests and global strategic security 
objectives.  
 
“Cardiff” has the potential to turn into a 
“great meeting”, if, and only if, Heads of State 
and Government will be able to provide 
guidance to develop a new and attractive 
narrative to underpin a solid transatlantic 
security relationship, in which NATO finds its 
place. The alternative is muddling through by 
launching once more a series (of already 
announced) buzzwords – that will not help 
allies from further drifting apart.  
 
HARMEL 
It is stating the obvious that once more East-
West relations have entered a quite different 
geopolitical era. This time, it is a particularly 
dangerous one, characterized by a major shift 
of power. Time has come to draw some hard 
lessons from recent events and trends, the way 
“we”, as Allies, have done before. 
 
In the late sixties, with the Harmel-report, the 
Alliance was given a renewed and attractive 
narrative that inspired all NATO countries’ 
No. 57 
July 2014 
BADLY NEEDED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE 
ATLANTIC ,  E XI STE NTIAL FOR  NATO 
Defence matters. It is said by all Heads of 
State and Government across the Atlantic and 
it implies that solid transatlantic security 
relations matter too, for NATO and the CSDP 
alike. The upcoming NATO summit matters in 
particular, because there are increasing signs 
that transatlantic partners are at risk of drifting 
apart.  “NATO: what’s in it for us? Now and 
in the future?”.  With the Ukrainian crisis, such 
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policies on East-West relations. The so-called 
“Harmel Doctrine” advocated a threefold 
approach: to maintain a strong defence, combined 
with a series of bilateral contacts between East 
and West European countries, and in so doing 
to forge a “détente” that ultimately created the 
diplomatic conditions to come to a global 
“European arrangement”. At the time “East- 
West relations” were focused on (limited to) 
the European continent. And it worked.  No 
longer so these days.   
 
It is prudent to state that the fundamentals of 
the transatlantic security strategy have 
remained intact. Maintaining a strong defence 
still is very much advisable. Territorial defence 
still matters. The “European arrangement” 
and the post-Cold War status quo on the 
European continent seems to belong to the 
past. Moreover, it is no longer only about 
Europe, and most if not all of the paradigms 
of crisis management have drastically changed.   
That is why “we” ought to be ambitious 
enough to deal with the real issues in Cardiff, 
including the relationship between NATO and 
the CSDP, which are after all the underlying 
policy instruments of our security partnership. 
It is of the essence no longer to duck this issue 
because of the “well-known reasons”, while all 
of the parameters of the sensitive issue of 
asymmetric memberships have recently 
changed drastically. There are new 
opportunities and even some solutions within 
reach. To pave the way for success, we must 
forge, upfront, a common understanding on 
the global geopolitical realities we are all 
presently facing.   
 
CURRENT EVENTS: GAME-CHANGERS 
OR SYMPTOMS?  
It may indeed be too soon to fully understand 
the real significance of the French revolution. 
It probably was a game-changer. This is to 
signal that we must be prudent to immediately 
qualify each and every crisis as a game-
changer. The crises in Moldova, Georgia, and 
recently in Ukraine are either leftovers of the 
 Cold War – ante Harmel – or, they do 
symptomize a return of Russia to a classic 
nineteenth century geopolitics, looking for 
buffer states. We should act accordingly.  
However, this stands in shrill contrast to the 
“postmodernist” concept of how to develop 
international relations. Favoured by many 
Europeans, it reflects a reality within the EU, 
but not really anywhere else. The Arab spring 
and recent conflicts ranging from North Africa 
over Syria up to Iraq are probably symptoms 
of a fundamental revolution that is to stay with 
us for decades, and the final outcome of which 
is unpredictable. As to China, it is not that 
reckless to state that this country has changed 
the game in a relative short timeframe.  
    
SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, IT IS ABOUT 
INTERESTS  
Looking to Russia from Washington, you first 
see the Bering Sea, the northern part of Asia 
and then, on the European side of the Urals, 
there is Moscow. From this viewpoint Russia is 
a middle-sized country to be measured by its 
potential to cause disruption in a large area that 
indeed includes Eastern Europe, but in the 
first place Asia. The measures taken by the US 
after the annexation of the Crimea to 
“reassure” European allies on NATO 
commitments may well have been inspired by 
the need to “assure” its Asian partners in the 
first place. Perhaps the real issue for 
Washington was to avoid that through 
collateral damage the Ukrainian crisis would 
turn into a game-changer in the Asian region. 
  
This is not to say that Europe is no longer “the 
principal partner” of the US when it comes to 
global security, on the contrary. But again, in 
crisis management and in particular when it 
comes to who is to take the lead in military 
interventions, the US is clearly asking 
Europeans to “rebalance” if not to “pivot” by 
taking up more responsibility.  
 
In the past, whenever a security crisis emerged, 
the President of the US traditionally called on 
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“the US and Allies” to take action, suggesting 
the US take the lead and the Allies follow. That 
has changed, already under the Bush 
administration. At the start of the Obama 
administration it was about the “US and 
European countries”, suggesting some kind of 
burden-sharing. Later that changed to “the US 
and Europe”, carefully avoiding the pitfall of 
mentioning “the EU and its Member States”. 
More recently, with the crisis in Ukraine, it was 
all about “the US and the EU”. The message is 
clear. Crisis management has to be conducted 
in a comprehensive way. The US will remain 
involved and will for instance react to any 
expansionist ambitions of Russia, but it will 
not allow itself to get distracted from its main 
geostrategic concerns in Asia. Globally 
speaking, the US continues to look towards 
Europe as its principal partner. But you only 
have a real partner if, when faced with a crisis, 
the outcome matters equally to the partner if 
not even more so.  
 
NATO’s article 5 matters profoundly to all. 
However on crisis management the US is 
expecting from Europeans that they achieve a 
certain autonomy in launching and sustaining 
significant operations, hence it is looking to 
Europe as an entity and urges individual 
countries to act together. Washington also 
expects that for the EU, security in its 
neighbourhood and even beyond, including 
Africa, matters – and that the EU acts 
accordingly.    
 
EUROPE: WAKE UP CALLS AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 
No single European country, not even a 
smaller avant-garde group of European 
countries, has the capabilities to conduct a 
military operation of the magnitude we needed 
to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. That was 
clearly put forward at Saint-Malo, and the 
required action was taken by introducing the 
ESDP in the framework of the Union and 
adopting the Headline Goal as the European 
level of ambition (by an EU counting at the 
time 15 Member States, today 28 and 
collectively still maintaining more man and 
women in military uniform than the US).  
 
Notwithstanding internal political differences, 
the war in Iraq generated some hard lessons as 
well, which laid the ground for turning the 
ESDP into the CSDP and inspired Javier 
Solana to draw up the European Security 
Strategy (ESS). Gradually more and more 
military operations where launched. Modest 
indeed, however not without risk. The military 
objectives set have always been reached.  
 
A third wakeup call was not ignored either. 
Right after the NATO Summit in Chicago, and 
well aware of the views in Washington (for 
instance on Asia), President Herman Van 
Rompuy developed his plan to put “Defence” 
on the agenda of the European Council. Based 
on all of these lessons learned, a roadmap has 
been developed. The NATO summit in Cardiff 
will take place in between two European 
Council meetings that have defence on the 
agenda.  
 
And then there was Ukraine. Bizarre to notice 
how in the immediate aftermath some 
European experts made a U-turn by declaring 
the CSDP virtually dead while advocating to 
simply turn to NATO as the only and ultimate 
solution for all security issues involving military 
action. This kind of wishful thinking points in 
the first place to a lack of consensus among 
Europeans on the real issue: a European 
security strategy.     
 
Within the EU, Member States are too often 
inclined to “agree to disagree”, in particular on 
strategic issues including defence and security. 
The net result is that whenever a particular 
military crisis management operation is finally 
launched by the Union, it always boils down to 
“so few who have to do so much in the name 
of so many”.  Not tenable for the Union, and 
not for any solid transatlantic relationship 
either.      
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More important is to recognise that the 
suggestion to transfer all responsibility for 
military matters to NATO creates the image that 
on the European side no further action is 
needed.  For sure not within the EU; perhaps 
even a drawdown of the CSDP could be 
considered. For NATO, probably a marginal 
upgrade would suffice.  The underlying 
conviction of this sort of reasoning is that when 
push comes to shove the US will always turn up 
and via NATO support Europeans with the 
Cavalry, the Planes and the Ships. Up to 
Europeans to provide lip service and some 
tactical military contributions. This may sound 
attractive. But let us have look at the mirror 
image. The EU is world champion in 
international trade and has a population twice 
that of the US. Logically therefore the 28 
Member States of the EU have henceforth to 
assume the bulk of the military spending of all 
Allies. Moreover Europeans receive the message 
from Washington that for small civil-military 
operations – the size of a Battle Group – 
Americans can stand on their own feet, but for 
all other military operations it would be up to 
the European Allies to take responsibility. 
Difficult to believe that this concept could be an 
easy sell for European politicians to their public 
opinion back home.   
 
Back to reality. As to public opinion in Europe, 
polls clearly show that there is great support for 
the CFSP and for the CSDP in particular. Much 
more support in effect than is voiced by their 
respective political leaders, even in countries that 
traditionally are sceptical towards European 
defence. For public opinion, Ukraine was a 
wakeup call to proceed in this matter.  
 
In retrospect, the conclusions of last 
December’s European Council remain valid and 
swift implementation is now of the essence. In 
the first place the High Representative is “to 
assess the impact of changes in the global 
environment, and to report (...) on the 
challenges and opportunities arising for the 
Union”, which is EU-speak for a developing a 
common security strategy.  
A TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION NOT OF 
LABOUR BUT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
It is common wisdom that the specificities of a 
given crisis determine which organisation, 
which coalition or any combination thereof is 
best placed to take the lead to resolve it by no 
less than a comprehensive approach. There is a 
growing insight that in the future Europeans, 
within the framework of the Union, will be 
called upon to take more responsibility, not 
least in their neighbourhood and even beyond. 
This implies, as mentioned by the High 
Representative Catherine Ashton in her report 
in the run up to the December 2013 European 
Council, that Europe must have “strategic 
autonomy”. So it is not about one organisation 
cooking the meal and the other doing the 
dishes, which is more a formula for a divorce. 
And taking the lead implies proper command 
structures as well.    
 
NO DUPLICATION, DUAL-USE INSTEAD    
And of course, in this respect all unnecessary 
duplication is to be avoided. Fortunately the 
EU already has the required structures at the 
strategic-political level and at the political- 
military level as well. As to the Operation HQ, 
the Union has a series of national and even an 
EU one in its inventory, a series that could 
perhaps be reduced, preferably to one (as 
NATO has done years ago). 
  
However some crucial Force HQ are lacking 
within the Union, while on the European 
continent they do exist. They are financed and 
manned by NATO countries.  In practical 
terms avoiding duplication between the CSDP 
and NATO is but possible by introducing the 
concept of “dual use” of assets and capabilities 
relevant to crisis management operations while 
at the same time respecting mutual autonomy. 
In crisis management as it stands today, with 
the emphasis on preventive action and rapid 
response, the “Berlin Plus arrangements” are 
but history. 
 
It is advisable to foster new arrangements 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 5 
 
ensuring automatic and immediate transfer of 
assets and capabilities between NATO and the 
EU from the moment the political decision is 
taken to launch a military crisis management 
operation by one of the two organisations. For 
NATO this would principally apply to some 
FHQs to be inserted into the EU chain of 
command. In order to respect the sovereignty of 
countries that are not a full member of the EU 
or NATO, they would be given the option to 
withdraw their personnel from participating. The 
commander is to ensure that his HQ remains 
fully operational at all times and in all scenarios, 
and has to adapt the permanent staffing of the 
HQ accordingly. For the EU this would apply to 
some specific military and civilian assets and 
capabilities, for which similar dispositions on 
operational readiness would have to be taken.  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Cardiff has the potential of turning into a “great 
meeting” if the real issues are dealt with. 
Suppose henceforth all CSDP-NATO meetings 
would have an official character, would this 
make any difference, or would the differences 
become more apparent? The only way out is to 
develop once more an attractive narrative.  
 
Some building blocks of a new narrative on 
transatlantic security can be recommended. A 
threefold approach is in order:  
1) NATO to maintain a strong defence:  
As put forward by the Harmel report, this 
remains the cornerstone of NATO, together 
with its Article 5. This is not to say that 
NATO has to pivot back to Russia 
exclusively, far from it.  
 
2) Enhanced bilateral contacts between the US and 
the EU leading to a genuine US-EU Strategic 
Partnership: To insert more strategy into the 
US - EU Strategic Partnership, in particular 
on security and defence issues. 
 In this respect it is up to the EU and its 
Member States to implement swiftly the 
decisions taken by the December 2013 
European Council, in particular on 
upgrading the European Security Strategy 
into a full-fledged strategy. 
The EU has to become serious on defence. 
Not only since otherwise the US will not 
be inclined to take the EU seriously. Not 
only because the US asks for it. But 
because the EU and for sure the European 
States will become strategic bystanders and 
even objects of great power competition – 
that would be a real game-changer.  
 
3) Introduce the concept of “dual-use” into the 
relationship between NATO and CSDP:  
The Berlin Plus arrangements are to be 
transformed into a mechanism 
guaranteeing immediate transfer of assets 
and capabilities relevant to crisis 
management operations once a political 
decision is taken to launch such an 
operation by either NATO or the EU. 
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